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A Prehistory of Peer Review: Religious
Blueprints from the Hartlib Circle∗
Brent Ranalli†
The conventional history of modern scientific peer review begins with
the censorship practices of the Royal Society of London in the 1660s. This
article traces one strand of the “prehistory” of peer review in the writings
of John Amos Comenius and other members of the Hartlib circle, a
precursor group to the Royal Society of London. These reformers appear
to have first envisioned peer review as a technique for theologians,
only later proposing to apply it to philosophy. The importance of peer
reviewwas as a technique thatwould permit a community of theologians
or philosophers to resolve disputes internally rather than publicly,
since public disputation would (they believed) sow doubt, error, and
confusion, and disrupt the social order.
The history of modern scientific peer review has yet to be wrien
authoritatively, but it is beginning to take shape (Zuckerman and Merton 1971;
Kronick 1990; Burnham 1990; Spier 2002; Biagioli 2002, 2003; Rennie 2003).
According to the best recent scholarship, most notably thework ofMario Biagioli
(2002; 2003), that history starts in 1663, when the recently formed Royal Society
of London passed a resolution authorizing the publication of books under its
imprimatur, as permied under its Royal Charter. The resolution required that
every book be reviewed by at least two members of the council of the Society.
The purpose of this review was to ensure that “nothing but what is suitable to
the design and work of the society” was published (Birch [1756] 1968, 347)—in
other words, that nothing was published outside the scope of what the Charter
permied and the Crown would consider innocuous. The French Académie
Royale des Sciences adopted similar licensing review procedures in 1699.
Such is our current understanding of the origins of modern scientific peer
review.1 But the existence of a history suggests a prehistory. We expect to find
a great deal more continuity of practices, ideas, and social networks than the
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1 Two important shis occurred before peer review took the form we know today. First, as the
importance of state-mandated censorship declined, academies developed policies for reviewing
journal submissions specifically for quality. The Royal Society of Edinburgh pioneered this
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conventional myth of the “scientific revolution” implies (Shapin 1996). So where
to look for a prehistory of scientific peer review?
Biagioli (2002) points out a couple of examples from the Catholic world. He
notes that in the 1620s members of the Accademia dei Lincei reviewed Galileo’s
Assayer before he submied it to censors, and that from the late sixteenth
century the Jesuits had a rigorous review system to ensure not only orthodoxy
but also quality. Reaching back even further, Spier (2002) points to proposals
for something akin to physician peer review in the writing of Ishaq bin Ali
al-Rahwi (CE 854-931). I wish to draw aention to evidence of a “prehistory” of
peer review much closer to the early Royal Society, specifically in the so-called
Hartlib circle, a group of reform-minded scholars and divines that gathered
around London philanthropist Samuel Hartlib in the mid-seventeenth century.
This group contributed several prominent members to the early Royal Society,
including Robert Boyle and Henry Oldenburg (Webster 1976).
The most celebrated member of the Hartlib circle was the Czech priest,
pedagogue, and “pansophic” reformer of the sciences Jan Amos Komenský (John
Amos Comenius). Late in life, Comenius published his treatise Via Lucis with
a dedication to the Royal Society, the only time he ever addressed that body
in writing. In the 1668 dedication Comenius exhorted the members of the new
scientific society to publish their truth-claims in a manner that is open to critical
scrutiny, reproduction, and verification by peers (indeed, by any reader):
Let your researches into Natural objects be so well established,
let them bear upon their face so complete an assurance of
trustworthiness, that if a man desires not merely to contemplate
your work as long as he likes with his unaided eyes, but even to try
its accuracy by the most exacting tests of his own device, he shall
be certain to find that the facts are precisely what you have shown
them to be. It will be an admirable precedent: and will encourage
those who are at the helm of human society in the State, or of the
consciences of men in the Church to act in the same way, following
indeed the example of the Apostles who did not fear to submit all
their doctrines to the scrutiny and judgment of the world (1. Cor. iv.
3, 4). (Comenius [1668] 1938, dedication 22-23)
It is characteristic of Comenius to treat religious maers and scientific maers
(and even, as here, political maers) in parallel. In this passage Comenius
practice in 1731. The Royal Society of London followed suit when it took over editorial
responsibility for the Philosophical Transactions in 1752 (Kronick 1990). Second, due in part
to increased scientific specialization, editors of scientific journals began delegating review to
outside experts rather than reviewing submissions in-house. This transition was more or less
complete by the middle of the twentieth century (Burnham 1990).
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encourages the scientists in London to set an example for religious leaders
by welcoming critical scrutiny. But there is no reason to assume that this
clergyman who dabbled in scientific maers derived his own ideas about
religious reform from scientific precedents—rather, we should expect the reverse.
Given Comenius’s abiding interest in irenic religious reform (an interest shared
with other members of the Hartlib circle), is there any indication that his
commitment to scientific peer scrutiny has precedents in the religious sphere?
As it turns out, Comenius did have such religious precedents at hand—not
only the allusion to 1 Corinthians (which is of doubtful relevance, as the Apostle
Paul invites judgment only to dismiss it), but, more germanely, in his ownwriting
and experience and the writing of Gabriel Plaes, another member of the Hartlib
circle. These precedents add an additional layer of interest by limiting the review
of new truth-claims, at least initially, to professional peers.
Let us begin with Plaes. His Macaria, a short utopian work wrien in
the form of a dialogue, was published in London in 1641.2 In this work Plaes
addresses the question central to the reformers’ irenic concerns: how to resolve
religious disputes. In the fictional land of Macaria, we learn, the clergy are of
one mind: “There are no diversitie of opinions amongst them.” He explains how
this unanimity is achieved and maintained:
They have a law, that if any Divine shall publish a new opinion to
the Common people, he shall be accounted a disturber of the publick
peace, and shall suffer death for it.… If any one hath conceived a
new opinion, he is allowed everie yeere freely to dispute it before
the Great Councell; if he overcome his Adversaries, or such as are
appointed to be Opponents, then it is generally received for truth; if
he be overcome, then it is declared to be false. ([Plaes?] 1641, 7)
The religious doctrines in Macaria, Plaes suggests, are superior because
they have been shown to withstand “the grand test of extreme dispute”
([Plaes?] 1641, 7). But the extremity of the dispute is really a secondary maer.
Seventeenth-century Europe, with its bier sectarian rivalries, had disputes in
plenty to test any controversial doctrine. What was significant about Macaria is
that the theological disputes were resolved internally, in the private, professional
space of the theological community. They were not allowed to become public
controversies that could threaten the social order.
In Panorthosia, wrien during Comenius’s later years and not published
during his lifetime, Comenius echoed this idea of theological peer review:
They [members of a proposed Ecumenical Consistory] will pay
careful aention to the canons of particular churches to ensure
2 Charles Webster (1972) demonstrated that this anonymous work, traditionally aributed to
Hartlib, was most likely wrien by Plaes with Hartlib’s input and encouragement.
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that they are not inconsistent with nor contrary to the Universal
Canons: for this would give rise to disagreements and secessions. If
any Church or any learned Churchman has any useful observation
to make, they should submit it for consideration in the first instance
to the local Consistory of the whole Kingdom, and finally, if it
presents a really difficult problem, to the Ecumenical Consistory. If
it is well-received, it will be approved: and thus it will carry more
weight and serve a more useful purpose than if its trial and adoption
were sanctioned only by an individual decision. (Comenius [1966]
1995, 242)
Again, there is room for debate about doctrine, but the debate will be
conducted behind closed doors, where it will not inflame public passions.
This line of reasoning is supported by the distinction that sixteenth- and
seventeenth-century irenicists made between “essential” and “non-essential”
articles of faith.3 On the assumption that Lutherans and Calvinists (for example)
agreed on all points of doctrine necessary to salvation, and differed only on
non-essential points, irenicists argued that theologians should refrain from
publicly disputing the non-essential points, reserving them for private scholarly
discussions (e.g., Zachman 2004, 91; see also the chapters by Erika Rummel and
Howard Hotson in the same volume).
Comenius incorporated these ideas directly into his philosophical reform
program in the body of Via Lucis, composed in London during Comenius’s visit
to Hartlib in 1641-42, shortly aer the publication of Macaria.4 In Via Lucis
Comenius proposes that elite scholars of every nation should join in establishing
a Universal College dedicated to perfecting scholarship for the benefit of the
human race.
Theymust not neglect to advise one another and by common counsel
to set right whatever in those books [a trio of “pansophic” books
intended to reform human knowledge] is found to need supplement
or correction. And beyond this, whenever it is granted to any man to
perceive any part of a more intimate mystery, he will not at his own
discretion bruit it abroad, but will communicate it to his brethren so
that the truth of what he has discovered may be established by fit
and proper tests, and so whatever God has given may be carried into
the common treasures of common knowledge for the profitable and
3 The distinction was not new in the sixteenth century. For a good brief historical overview of
the idea of adiaphora (things customary but inessential to salvation) in the Christian tradition,
see Verkamp (1975, 55ff).
4 Although it was not published until 1668, Via Lucis presumably circulated in manuscript. A
copy was in the hands of his London friends in 1642 (Comenius [1668] 1938, dedication 5;
Turnbull 1947, 367).
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wholesome use of mankind. And care must be taken that only those
things which are truly mysteries [i.e., valid insights] shall be held or
proclaimed to be such. (Comenius [1668] 1938, 174-75)
We see again the familiar concern to keep error and dissension from spilling
over into the public sphere. Though Comenius is talking here about universal
scholarship, not just theology, the overtly religious language and reference to
scientific or philosophical insights as “mysteries” reinforces the idea that he
borrowed the sense of this passage from a religious context, quite possibly
Macaria.
It is worth noting that Comenius had other sources to draw on besides
Macaria for the idea of “peer review” in religion. Doctrinal issues within his
Hussite sect, the Unity of Brethren, had long been decided on the basis of
consensus (Brock 1957; Atwood 2009). Even in secular maers, disputes between
members of the sect were supposed to be resolved internally, by a panel of
peers (“a panel of arbitrators appointed from among fellow members”), rather
than in the law courts (Brock 1957, 216).5 For the minority sect, resolving
internal disputes quietly and directly was a religious commitment—caritas in
action—and it was also ameans of communal self-preservation in an oen hostile
political-religious environment.
The relation between public religious dissension and social strife is obvious,
and was tangibly so in the era of the Thirty Years’ War and the English Civil
War. A similar relation between public scientific dissension and social strife
is less obvious to us, but it was clear to Comenius.6 Fellows of the early
Royal Society appear to have been sensitive to it as well. Steven Shapin and
Simon Schaffer (1985, 332-33) suggest that Robert Boyle and his colleagues
were acutely aware that problems of knowledge are intimately bound up with
problems of social order, and that this impelled them to conduct their disputes
behind closed doors, away from the eye of the public. Both the privacy of their
deliberations and their exercise of peer review vis-à-vis the wrien word can
be understood as forms of self-censorship, designed to shield from public view
tedious technical arguments, ungentlemanly disagreements, and inchoate or
imprudent theses—“dirty laundry”7 that, if exposed to view, had the potential
to prejudice the public or the royal patron against the fledgling institution.
5 An example from Comenius’s own experience: Aer a Polish co-religionist denounced his
pansophic proposals as impious, Comenius was obliged to explain his ideas before a synod
of the assembled clergy of the sect in 1639 (Comenius [1669] 1975, par 49). The outcome,
Comenius reports, was that his pansophic calling was given the Church’s blessing and the
dispute was put to rest.
6 See, for example, his description of the learned class in his allegorical Labyrinth of the
World (Comenius [1631] 1942) and his prescriptions for peace and concord through reform
of intellectual life (e.g., Comenius [1668] 1938, dedication 4).
7 This expression is climatologist Michael Mann’s. Sending an old data file to an inquiring
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To sum up: The history of modern scientific peer review begins with the
censorship practices of the Royal Society of London in the 1660s. A “prehistory”
of the idea of scientific peer scrutiny and censorship can be traced in the writings
of the Hartlib circle of reformers who were prominent in London a generation
earlier, in particular to the pansophic writings of Comenius. Comenius, in
turn, took his cue from proposals and practices in the religious sphere, where
peer scrutiny and corporate self-censorship among theologians was intended to
reduce public controversy. Comparison of the Hartlib circle’s prescriptions and
the Royal Society’s practices suggests that the prevention of unnecessary public
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